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Reconstructing Human Nature1 
PAUL E. GRIFFITHS* 
The humanities and social sciences can hardly avoid making claims 
about human nature. The biological sciences are an obvious source 
of evidence to underpin or to undermine such claims. But attempts 
to access this evidence remain controversial. To some 'the biological 
basis of human nature' is the sound of science being mobilised behind 
a social agenda.2 In its turn, this scepticism is frequently condemned 
as ideologically motivated.3 
In this lecture I assume that there is a human nature, in the 
straightforward sense that it is possible to generalise about human 
beings. If this were not possible the humanities and social sciences 
would be restricted to the study of individuals and particular social 
groups. But many disciplines aim at knowledge of human beings 
in general and of human society in general. I will assume that they 
are right to do so. I will also assume that the biological sciences can 
help them to achieve their aims. My aim will be to show that this 
descriptive understanding of 'human nature' can be dissociated 
from some other connotations of the phrase. First, human nature is 
commonly thought of not merely as a description of what humans 
are like, but as the reason we are like that. I will argue that insofar as 
human nature can be conceived as an underlying cause of widespread 
human characteristics, it involves the whole organism-environment 
system that supports human development. There is no special part of 
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human beings such as our blood or our genes where human nature 
resides. Second, the generality of human nature stems from our ability 
to discern structure in the patterns of human similarity and difference, 
not merely from the existence of human universals. 
Taken together these two themes weaken the association between 
the idea that something is part of human nature and the idea that 
it is inevitable. It is surely this association that has made many in 
the humanities and social sciences suspicious of biological accounts 
of human nature. However, overcoming the presumption that 
something cannot be changed does not imply that it can be changed, 
let alone that it can be easily changed. Perhaps the most important 
conclusion of this lecture is that the plasticity of human nature is 
a very specific research question and that it has traditionally been 
conflated with several other issues, issues which have as a result 
become unnecessarily controversial. 
Before examining how the various connotations of the idea of 
human nature come apart, I will try to explain how they came to 
be put together. I will suggest that the presumption that the several 
connotations of the 'human nature' form a single package is part of 
an intuitive understanding of animals and their development that 
owes little if anything to the biological sciences. 
Human nature as folkbiology 
People do not need a scientific education to believe that plants and 
animals come in different kinds, and that each of those kinds has a 
nature shared by the individuals of that kind. Extra-scientific ideas 
about plants and animals are referred to as 'folkbiology', a term 
also used for the field which studies these ideas and is part of the 
broader field of cognitive anthropology.4--6 Folkbiology research 
suggests that people everywhere identify at least three general 
levels of biological classification: a 'generic species' category (e.g., 
wombats and bluegums), a super-ordinate category of biological 
domains (e.g., animals and plants), and a subordinate category 
of species varieties (e.g., particular breeds or strains, such as the 
mountain brush-tailed possum). The generic species level is of 
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particular importance. Membership in a generic species is associated 
with 'psychological essentialism'.' This is the belief that members 
of a species share an essence or inner nature which causes them to 
share the typical properties of that kind." 8,9 Human nature is simply 
the application of psychological essentialism to human beings. 
Psychological essentialism has been used to explain two findings 
about folkbiology. First, adults believe that membership in a species 
is inherited by descent and is not changed if someone or something 
changes the observable properties of an individual, even if this change 
makes the individual more similar to members of another generic 
species than to members of its original generic species. Second, 
adults believe that the development of species-typical traits does not 
depend on environmental influences. If asked to imagine a cow that 
has been raised by a family of pigs, adults assume that the cow will 
display the normal bovine trait of mooing instead of oinking like the 
pigs. 1O,11 Scott Atran has proposed that folkbiology has another core 
feature: the tendency to explain traits teleologicallyY That is, people 
tend to explain the traits possessed by animals and plants by asserting 
that these traits have a purpose, but this additional proposal remains 
controversial. 13- 13 
I have argued elsewhere that terms like 'innate', 'instinctive' 
and 'human nature' are expressions of this kind of psychological 
essentialism.16 They express aspects of a folkbiological (implicit) 
theory of 'animal natures'Y Animal natures are transmitted from 
parent to offspring. When an individual develops, some of its traits 
are expressions of this inner nature, whilst others are imposed by 
the environment. The idea of human nature is simply an instance of 
this way of thinking. 
Folkbiological classifications of plants and animals have an 
important practical role. They provide a framework for inductive 
inference. Generalisations from one organism to another are made in 
proportion to the distance of those organisms in the folk taxonomy. If 
you have never grown runner beans, you will place more confidence 
in your experience with french beans as a basis for doing so than in 
your experience with eucalypt saplings. The folkbiological distinction 
between traits that are expressions of an animal's nature and those 
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that are imposed by the environment has a related role. It specifies the 
range of traits for which inductive inference within a species or larger 
folk classification is supposed to be reliable. If a trait is an expression 
of an animal's nature, then it make sense to expect other members of 
the species to share it. It also provides a source of expectations about 
heredity. If I wanted to breed a more aggressive brush-tailed possum 
in my locality I might try to do so by crossing local possums with 
the notoriously aggressive mountain sub-species, on the assumption 
that aggressiveness is part of their nature, along with differences 
in size and colour. But I would not expect the offspring of these 
matings to share their other parent's preference for my verandah 
over neighbouring verandahs, on the assumption that that is not 
part of their nature. 
Bringing out the role of folkbiology in practical inferences of this 
kind helps to clarify what is meant by talk of an 'implicit theory' of 
animal natures. The mental representations which people use to think 
about animals produce characteristic patterns of inferential behavior. 
We can infer something about the structure of those representations 
from these patterns. This inferred structure is the 'folk theory' of this 
particular cognitive domain. 
The folkbiology of animal natures 
If 'animal natures' are to play their role in folkbiology, there must be 
some way to tell that a trait is an expression of an animal's nature. In 
earlier work, I suggested that three features are particularly associated 
with traits that are expressions of the inner nature that organisms 
inherit from their parents.16,17 These features are: 
1. Fixity - the trait is hard to change; its development is insensitive 
to environmental inputs in development; its development appears 
goal-directed, or resistant to perturbation. 
2. Typicality - the trait is part of what it is to be an organism of that 
kind; every individual has it, or every individual that is not 
malformed, or every individual of a certain age, sex or other 
natural subcategory. 
3. Teleology - this is how the organism is meant to develop; to lack 
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the innate trait is to be malformed; environments that disrupt the 
development of this trait are themselves abnormal. 
Whether a trait has these three features will influence whether it is 
thought to stem from an animal's inner nature. Conversely, if a trait 
is thought to stem from an animal's inner nature it will be expected to 
have these three features. At a practical level, this means that evidence 
that a trait has one of the three features will lead to the expectation 
that it has the others. 
The three features are described in very general terms, because 
they are supposed to be broad themes that will be interpreted and 
expressed differently in different cultures. For example, consider 
Teleology. The sense that interfering with an animal's nature leads 
to deformity or monstrosity, rather than simply something different, 
can be found in contemporary discussion of genetic engineering in 
the idea of 'genomic integrity'. H. G Wells's 1896 novel The Island of 
Dr Moreau shares this sense that no good can come of interfering, 
but in his case it is interference with the 'laws of growth', a concept 
derived from contemporary embryology. In a religious context these 
same normative overtones might be understood in terms of interfering 
with the divine order of things. A medieval or renaissance author 
would most naturally reach for the Aristotelian idea that form may 
fail to properly manifest itself in a particular sample of matter. For 
our purposes what is of interest is not the many ways in which people 
have thought that development is a normative process, but the broad 
existence of a sense that development is a normative process. It is this 
that I have labelled 'Teleology'. 
The philosophical literature on the distinction between innate 
and acquired characteristics contains numerous proposed analyses 
of the concept of innateness.ls There is an obvious overlap between 
the idea of innateness and the idea that animals have an inner 
nature, and so these analyses are potentially in competition \vith 
the three-feature model just outlined. But the three-feature model 
differs from traditional 'conceptual analyses' in some important 
ways. First, it is not intended to capture the meaning of a particular 
word, or a concept expressed by that word. Instead, it is an analysis of 
conceptual structure at a molar level: it purports to describe a model 
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which people use to conceptualize a domain of phenomena, and 
which might be reflected in the use of several different terms when 
people are describing those phenomena. Second, the elements of the 
analysis are not supposed to constitute the concept under analysis in 
the way that truth, belief and justification are supposed to constitute 
knowledge in perhaps the most famous conceptual analysis of them 
all. 19 Instead the three features function as evidence for the presence 
of something else - an inner nature - and conversely as inferences 
that can be made from the presence of such a nature. 
This model of the folkbiology of animal natures was tested by 
Machery, Linquist and myself by examining the effect of the three 
features on naIve subjects' application of the distinction between 
innate and acquired characteristics.17 We argued that subjects will 
label a trait as innate to the extent that they take it to stem from the 
animal's inner nature, rather than being imposed on the animal by 
its environment. In that case, the three-feature model predicts that 
judgments of innateness will be influenced by all three features, and 
that they will influence those judgments independently, since each 
of the three features is evidence for a further, underlying property, 
not for one another. 
To test these predictions, the three features were systematically 
co-varied in eight vignettes describing the development ofbirdsong. 
Birdsong was chosen because there are around nine thousand species 
of birds, with diverse methods of developing song, and the study 
of this diversity has been a major field of biological research for the 
past fifty years. Hence it was possible to provide realistic examples 
of bird song development manifesting every possible combination of 
the three features. An example of one of the eight vignettes is: 
Birdsong is one of the most intensively studied aspects of animal behaviour. 
Since the 1950s scientists have used recordings and sound spectograms 
to uncover the structure and function of birdsong. Neuroscientists have 
investigated in great detail the areas of the brain that allow birds to 
develop and produce their songs. Other scientists have done ecological 
fieldwork to study what role song plays in the lives of different birds. 
The Alder Flycatcher (Empidonax alnorum) is a migratory neo-tropical bird 
which breeds in southern Canada and the northern USA. Studies on the 
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Alder flycatcher show that the song an adult male produces does not 
depend on which songs they hear when they are young. Studies also show 
that different male~ in this species sing different songs. Furthermore, duse 
observations of these birds reveal that the males' song attracts mates and 
helps to defend their territory. Scientists therefore agree that the bird's 
song has a real function, like the heart in humans. 
On a 7-point scale, 1 meaning strongly disagree and 7 meaning strongly 
agree, how would you respond to the following statement? 
'1he song of the male Alder Flycatcher is innate.' 
The first paragraph was the same for all the vignettes. The first 
sentence of the second paragraph introduced the bird by naming it 
and giving some irrelevant facts about it. The rest of the paragraph 
contained three 'information items' relevant to the three features, 
each in either a negative and positive version. Fixity was represented 
by whether or not the bird acquires its song by hearing it when it is 
young. Typicality was represented by whether or not song differs 
between individuals. Teleology was represented by whether or not 
the song has a 'function'. The order of these items was, of course, 
randomised to avoid order effects. 
A fuller account of the experimental designs and data analysis 
can be found in the original publication.17 The results were broadly 
supportive of the three-factor theory. In a between-subject study, 
in which each subject saw only one vignette, the three information 
items explained 22 per cent of the variance in their responses. This 
is quite a small proportion. However, we suspected this was merely 
because, in a between-subject design, any differences between subjects 
in background beliefs about the topic would show up as unexplained 
variance. This suspicion was borne out by the results of a within-
subject study in which each subject responded to all eight vignettes. 
In this version, the three features accounted for 70 per cent of the 
variance. The greatest portion of variance was explained by Fixity, a 
slightly smaller amount by Typicality, and a very small amount by 
Teleology. Most significantly, there was no interaction between the 
three features. Each had an independent effect on whether the song 
was judged to be an innate trait. 
In recent research currently under review we have developed new 
36 
versions of the vignettes which we believe address some deficiencies 
in the original versions.20 Unfortunately the conditions of acceptance 
forbid prior publication of the main findings of this paper, so they 
can only be described here in very general terms. A replication of the 
original study with these new vignettes confirms our previous results, 
with the exception that the effect of Teleology was not significant. This, 
together with the small size of the effect in the original study, suggests 
that Teleology is marginally relevant if at all to the application of 
the term 'innate'. However, as mentioned above, the three-feature 
model purports to describe how people conceptualize a domain of 
phenomena and this conceptualisation could be reflected in the use of 
several different terms when people are describing those phenomena. 
Our recent studies have shown that replacing the term 'innate' with 
other terms commonly used to discuss the issue of innate versus 
acquired alters the relative significance of the three features. With one 
particularly prominent term all three features explain a substantial 
proportion of the variance, with Teleology the second largest factor. 
The folkbiology of animal natures is undoubtedly complex, and 
it may vary significantly between individuals and between groups. 
Nevertheless, the three-feature model does seem to capture something 
of how biologically naIve subjects understand animal natures and, 
by extension, human nature. 
Folkbiology is false 
It seems that people without a formal biology education manifest 
an implicit belief that an animal has an inner nature which makes it 
the kind of animal that it is, and which explains why the animal has 
certain traits that typify that kind. People judge that a trait sterns 
from an animal's nature using evidence about Fixity, Typicality and 
Teleology. They also expect that traits which stem from an animal's 
nature will be Fixed, Typical, and Teleological. The problem is that 
this picture of the living world is not borne out by biology. 
The most obvious way in which the folkbiological picture fails 
to mesh with biology is that neo-Darwinism denies that members 
of a species share some common underlying property - presumably 
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a genetic property - which makes them members of that species'.!n. 
21,22 Instead, Darwinian species are collections of organisms united 
by a pattern of ancestry and descent, There is no particular stretch 
of DNA that an organism needs to possess to belong to a species. 
An organism can even be more genetically similar overall to some 
members of another species than to some members of its own species. 
Membership of a species is like membership of a family, not like 
being a sample of a chemical element,23-25 But this criticism does very 
little to destabilise folkbiology. It seems clear that most biologically 
naIve people today believe that it is an animal's DNA which makes 
it the kind of animal that it is. This is true however little they know 
about DNA. They may also believe that human beings are humans 
and cats are cats because of some special genes found in all and only 
humans and all and only cats respectively. But this second belief can 
be dropped while leaving the first belief intact, and the conceptual 
scheme of folkbiology can allow that there are differences between 
the natures of one animal and the next, as long as the members of 
a species have natures that are very similar to one another, and the 
fact that something is part of an animal's nature implies that it will 
be shared by almost all individuals of the same species. 
A more significant way in which folkbiology is not borne out by 
biological science is that when the three features of Fixity, Typicality 
and Teleology are given a contemporary biological interpretation, 
they turn out not to be strongly associated with one another. 
What I mean by a 'biological interpretation' of a feature is some 
property which manifests the basic conceptual themes of that feature, 
but which also makes sense in terms of current biology. For example, 
the Aristotelian idea of formal causation would not be a good 
biological interpretation of Teleology, because contemporary biology 
does not recognise formal causation. Instead, the obvious biological 
interpretation of Teleology is Darwinian adaptation. Normativity 
is accommodated in the conceptual framework of neo-Darwinism 
by appealing to design by natural selection.26,27 An organism is 
malformed if it fails to develop the phenotype which it was designed 
to develop by natural selection. 
The obvious biological interpretation of Fixity is 'canalisation'.28 
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A trait is environmentally canalised if its development is relatively 
insensitive to the manipulation of environmental parameters. A trait 
is genetically canalised if its development is relatively insensitive to 
the manipulation of genetic parameters. The philosopher Andre 
Ariew has argued that the concept of innateness should be redefined 
to mean simply environmental canalisation. A trait is more innate 
the more environmental parameters its development is unaffected 
by, and the wider the range of variation in those parameters which 
fail to affect it.z9,3o 
The obvious biological interpretation of Typicality is being a 
species-typical characteristic. A trait is species-typical if a scientific 
description of the species would have no reason to mention variation 
in that trait. This does not mean that no variation exists, but rather 
that it can be safely regarded as pathological, or too rare to be of any 
biological significance. 
It is worth noting tha t versions of these three biological properties 
appear, along with several others, in Matteo Mameli and Patrick 
Bateson's review of the many definitions of the term 'innate' that 
have been proposed in biology.31 
Given these biological interpretations of the three features I will 
now argue that: 
1. Adaptation (Teleology) does not imply developmental 
canalisation (Fixity); 
2. Typicality does not imply environmental canalisation (Fixity); 
3. Adaptation (Teleology) does not imply Typicality, 
1. Adaptation does not imply developmental canalisation 
It is easy to suppose that traits which have evolved by natural 
selection must develop independently of the specifics of the 
developmental environment. If a trait plays a role in promoting 
survival and reproduction, surely its development cannot be left to 
chance? But this thought overlooks an alternative source of stability. 
Rather than making development independent of environmental 
parameters, evolution can make development reliable by stabilizing 
environmental parameters at the right value or by exploiting pre-
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existing environmental regularities. The birdsong researchel'~ 
Meredith West and Andrew King have described development 
as occurring in an 'ontogenetic niche'. West and King and their 
collaborators have conducted a long term study of the ontogenetic 
niche of the Brown-headed Cowbird Molothrus Ater which exemplifies 
this conceptY-34 Cowbirds are obligate nest parasites (like cuckoos) 
and do not hear their parents sing as they grow up. It was therefore 
assumed that they sing 'innately'. West and King showed that 
amongst other processes, male song is shaped by feedback from 
female cowbirds, whose wing stroking and gaping displays in 
response to the songs are strong reinforcers for males. Female song 
preferences are themselves socially transmitted. As a result of these 
and other processes cowbirds reliably transmit not only species-
typical song, but also regional song dialects. 
In many species, the stabilization of the parameters of 
the ontogenetic niche is achieved through parental care. The 
developmental psychobiologist Celia Moore has shown how the 
sexual development of male rats depends on maternal care. 35,36 
The spinal cord nuclei of male rats differ from those of female rats 
in ways that allow the male to use his penis during copulation. 
These neural differences result from differences in gene expression 
in the developing spinal cord of the rat pup, which in turn result 
from differences in the amount of licking of the genital area by the 
mother, which in turn results from greater expression in male pups 
of a chemical that elicits maternal licking. This kind of research - the 
experimental study of how the structure of the organism at anyone 
stage in its development, starting with the fertilised egg, interacts with 
the developmental niche to give rise to the next stage - is typical of 
the field of developmental psychobiologyY 
There is a strong evolutionary rationale for the existence of the 
'ontogenetic niche'. Natural selection does not select for mechanisms 
which buffer traits against variation in the environment unless 
variation of that kind regularly occurs in the environments in which 
the species lives. There is no evolutionary advantage in a mechanism 
to allow cowbirds to develop song in environments in which they do 
not associate with members of their own species after fledging, or rats 
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to develop normal sexual behaviour in environments in which they 
are not cared for by their mothers. In fact, any buffering mechanism 
which is not regularly used will tend to decay by mutation. One 
famous example is the inability of humans and their relatives to 
synthesise ascorbic acid (vitamin C). The ascorbic acid synthesis 
pathway was disabled by mutation during the long period in which 
our fruit-eating ancestors had no chance of developing vitamin C 
deficiences.3~ As Terence Deacon has put it, organisms are 'addicted' 
to innumerable aspects of their environments, from ascorbic acid, to 
gravity, to social interactions.39 
2. Typicality does not imply environmental canalisation 
This follows more or less directly from the considerations just given. 
One of the functions of the ontogenetic niche is to ensure the reliable 
development of species-typical traits (the other, complimentary 
function will be discussed in the next section). The ontogenetic 
niche is precisely a way of ensuring the trans-generational stability 
of adaptations without environmental canalisation. 
Another way to look at the concept of the ontogenetic niche is to 
consider the organism as a 'developmental system', which includes 
both the traditional starting point of an organism - the egg - and those 
aspects of what would traditionally be described as the environment 
which make up the ontogenetic niche for that egg. 40--431£ we consider 
the whole system, then many adaptations are, indeed, canalised 
against perturbations in developmental parameters - both genetic 
and environmental. The mechanisms that create this canalisation 
extend far beyond the contents of the fertilised egg, let alone the 
genetic material which it contains. In the case of the cowbird discussed 
above, the reliability with which cowbirds develop species-typical 
song is ensured by mechanisms that include a flock of cowbirds. The 
burgeoning study of these distributed mechanisms for canalising 
normal development has been termed 'ecological developmental 
biology'.44 
The concepts of ontogenetic niche and developmental system run 
counter to a widely shared intuition that the true nature of something 
is best revealed by removing exogenous influences and allowing it 
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to develop under the influence of endogenous factors alone. When 
applied to organisms, that intuition is simply wrong. 1L40 You cannot 
find out what an ant is 'really like' by removing the influence ot the 
rest of the ant colony. These 'external influences' are an essential 
part of the biological nature of the ant. It is these 'environmental' 
factors that will determine whether it develops into a queen, a 
worker or some other caste, to mention only the grossest aspects of 
its phenotype. It is equally absurd to suppose that the 'biological' 
aspects of human beings can be revealed by removing the perturbing 
influence of society or culture.46 
3. Adaptation does not imply Typicality 
The process of evolution by natural selection has no intrinsic tendency 
to produce species-typical traits. Some adaptations are monomorphic 
- all human beings have lost the ability to synthesise vitamin C. Other 
adaptations are polymorphic - some human beings can metabolise 
lactose as adults and others cannot. 
It is hard to see why the prejudice that adaptations will be species-
typical persists, given the obvious evolutionary rationales for these 
alternative outcomes. Natural selection will favour monomorphic 
traits when the relevant ecological factors are temporally stable and 
spatially uniform, and when there is a single winning strategy in 
evolutionary competition. When the success of a strategy depends 
on which strategy other organisms adopt (frequency-dependent 
selection), selection will often favour polymorphic outcomes. When 
ecological factors fluctuate over time, selection may maintain a variety 
of types, or favour the emergence of 'phenotypic plasticity' y-49 When 
ecological factors fluctuate across space, selection will favour the 
emergence of a range of 'ecotypes', or the evolution of phenotypic 
plasticity. 
The second function of the ontogenetic niche is to provide the 
input to mechanisms of phenotypic plasticity, the phenomena in 
which organisms develop differently depending on the environment 
in which they find themselves. The classical example of phenotypic 
plasticity is the water flea Daphnia pulex, which invests resources in 
growing a defensive 'helmet' if it is exposed to chemical traces of 
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predators, or if its mother has been exposed to those traces. SD The 
first of these triggers is an example of intra-generational phenotypic 
plasticity, and the second of trans-generational phenotypic plasticity, 
also known as a 'parental effect' on the phenotype.51,52 
I discussed above how parental care can be used to stabilize the 
parameters of the ontogenetic niche. But parental care can also be used 
as a mechanism of adaptive phenotypic plasticity. A 'parental effect' is 
a correlation between the phenotype of the parent and the phenotype 
of the offspring over and above any correlation due to the genes 
passed from parent to offspring. The account by Michael Meaney 
and collaborators of the role of parental care in the development of 
temperament in mice and rats is a good example of this phenomenon. 
The BALBc strain of laboratory mouse is 
highly fearful, and maze dull ... these animals show increased endocrine 
and behavioral responses to stress, they are hyperactive and show 
profound learning and memory deficits that are associated with, among 
things, impaired hippocampal development.53,57 
Cross-fostering BALBc pups to mothers of the more laid-back C57 
strain removes the differences between the two strains. Working 
with individual differences in a population of laboratory rats, 
rather than the difference between two strains of mice, Meaney 
and collaborators showed how the amount of licking and arched-
back nursing which pups receive from their mother regulates gene 
expression so as to direct the development of the pup's brain.54 It is 
plausible that in wild rats maternal behaviour reflects the mother's 
stress levels. It may convey information to the pup about the likely 
quality of its environment and 'preset' stress metabolism to match 
that environment. 
Peter Gluckman and collaborators have applied a similar 
approach to human health.5s- 57 They argue that the prevalence of 
many common 'lifestyle diseases' has a significant component that 
is due to the malfunctioning of mechanisms of phenotypic plasticity. 
In 'predictive adaptive responses' the developing foetus uses cues 
from the metabolism of the mother to set a developmental trajectory 
that will be adaptive in environments predicted by those cues. 
When the relationship between cue and environment has changed, 
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as they argue it has in many cases today, these mechanisms produce 
maladaptive outcomes. 
Human nature and developmental systems 
I have given some examples of ways in which Fixity, Typicality and 
Teleology can become dissociated. In the light of this it becomes 
possible to get to the heart of what is wrong with the tolkbiological 
conception of 'animal natures'. When William Johanssen introduced 
the terms' gene', 'genotype' and 'phenotype',iS he did so by contrasting 
the 'genotype conception of heredity' with the earlier conception 
of heredity derived from human cultural practices of inheritance. 
When I inherit a house, it is the very house that my parents lived in. 
The house reflects the cultural environment of the generation who 
built it - parents or grandparents - not the cultural environment of 
the person who inherits it. But genetic inheritance is not like this. In 
genetic inheritance I inherit a developmental factor - a gene - which 
interacts with my environment to produce a phenotypic outcome. 
This is why Johanssen needed to introduce the distinction between 
genotype and phenotype, to make clear that no-one literally inherits 
blue eyes or coronary heart disease. Earlier theories of biological 
heredity had concentrated on the correlation between parent and 
offspring, as if it were the parent's phenotype that produced the 
offspring's phenotype. But correlations between parent and offspring 
phenotypes are only indirectly related to the mechanisms of biological 
heredity. If I and my father both have coronary heart disease it is 
not because I have inherited my father's coronary heart disease, but 
because I have inherited genes that produce coronary heart disease 
in certain environments, and my father and I both live in those kinds 
of environment. 
In his 1911 paper Johanssen explained the relationship between 
genotype and phenotype using the 'norm of reaction' - a graphical 
representations of a phenotypic variable as a function of genotypic 
and environmental variables.59 The norm of reaction concept makes 
clear that all traits depend upon both genes and environment, even 
those which are, in the clearest sense of the phrase, genetically 
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determined. A trait can be said to be genetically determined if WiU1 
respect to some environmental variable (E) an organism with a 
given genotype (Gl) will develop the same phenotype (P) way, no 
matter what value the environmental variable takes [Figure 1]. For 
example, a disease caused by the loss of one or both normal copies of 
a gene might develop in every environment except those specifically 
structured as clinical interventions to cure the disease. Nevertheless, 
if we wanted to understand how this disease develops, we would 
need to understand both genetic and environmental factors, and 
how they interact. The reverse applies, of course, to traits which are 
completely' environmental' - to understand how these traits develop 
it is necessary to understand how the environments which' determine' 





Figure 1: A norm of reaction in which the phenotype P is 'genetically determined'. 
A norm of reaction figure makes it obvious that genetic (or 
environmental) determinism is special case. If genetic and environmental 
factors interact I additively' [Figure 2] then the phenotypic value depends 
on both genetics and environment. But in this case, genotype makes 
a constant difference across some range of environments. While the 
genetic variable does not determine the actual value of the phenotypic 
trait in each individual, it does determine the differences between 
individuals. Some authors have suggested that genetics and IQ are 
related in this way.60 If correct, this would mean that educational 
enrichment would cause everyone to get higher test scores, but would 
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Figure 2: Purely additive interaction between genotype and environment. 
A third possibility is that genotype and environment interact non-
additively [Figure 3]. In that case they jointly determine the outcome 
in a very strong sense: the effect of each factor on the outcome is a 
function of the particular value taken by the other factor. Thus, for 
example, an animal with genotype 1 might grow larger than an animal 
with genotype 2 in one environment but not in another. Sophisticated, 
scientific critiques of 'genetic determinism' are not attempts to 
elevate the environment at the expense of the genes. They argue that 





Figure 3: Non-additive interaction between genotype and environment. 
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The error at the heart of folkbiology is the idea that some traits are 
expressions of an internal factor - the nature of the animal - whilst 
others result from the action of the environment. If the best biological 
interpretation of an animal's inner nature is its genetic endowment, 
then this is false. Both 'innate' and 'acquired' traits result from the 
interaction of genes and environment - a truism sometimes known 
as the 'interactionist consensus'.63 The difference between innate and 
acquired traits is a matter of the shape of the norm of reaction, which 
is a property of the whole developmental system. Most importantly, 
'innate' and 'acquired' are simply two amongst the many patterns 
of interaction between genes and environment. Once we consider 
two variables, that is, more than one genetic and one environmental 
parameter, it is not even clear that innate and acquired can be 
interpreted as two ends of a spectrum .64 
At a still deeper level, the folkbiological conception of the organism 
is inadequate. It conceives of an animal as having a finished, adult 
form. Development is a goal directed process directed towards that 
end, and senescence is a decline from that finished state. But, as the 
developmental biologist Conrad Waddington noted: 
An animal is, in fact, a developmental system, and it is these systems, not 
the mere static adult forms which we conventionally take as typical of the 
species, which become modified in the course of evolution.40 
From an evolutionary point of view an organism is a process from 
conception to death. This process is the implementation of a life-
history strategy - a series of decisions to allocate resources to growth, 
reproduction and other activities.65 The real product of evolution is 
not an adult phenotype, but a developmental system that gives rise 
to a life-history. 
'But only genes are inherited ... ' 
DNA or 'the genes' have become popular culture signifiers for the true 
nature of each animal or even, in some recent advertisements, the true 
nature of each brand of car.66, 67 This identification is reinforced by the 
idea that genes are the only thing an animal genuinely inherits from 
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its parents, or at least that the only alternative to genetic heredity is a 
special phenomenon called 'cultural heredity' found in humans and 
in a minimal form in a few other species. The environment may be 
essential for the genes to produce an organism, but the environment 
cannot be part of the nature of the organism because it is not inherited. 
But it is simply not true that biological systems reproduce 
themselves by tossing strands of DNA into the world to meet their 
fate. Instead, natural selection has created many ways in which 
parents can influence the form of their offspring in addition to 
providing their genome. These mechanisms are commonly referred 
to as mechanisms of 'epigenetic inheritance'.68-71 The term 'epigenesis' 
has a long and distinguished history in biological thought, stretching 
back far beyond the discovery of genetics. In current usage, however, 
'epigenetic inheritance' has two senses, one rather specific and one 
more general. In the strictest sense, epigenetic inheritance refers to the 
transmission of material in the fertilised egg in addition to the DNA 
and which acts to modify gene expression in the next generation. 
The best studied of these mechanisms is DNA methylation, a process 
by which organisms can attach additional chemical groups to some 
of the nucleotides that make up the DNA sequence so as to render 
certain genes more or less active in their offspring. Male and female 
parents often apply different methylation patterns, giving rise to the 
phenomenon of 'parental imprinting' in which a genetic variant only 
produces a phenotypic effect if it is inherited from a parent of one 
sex. Methylation underlies many of the 'parental effects' mentioned 
above. Other important mechanisms of epigenetic inheritance 
include modifications of the structural components of chromosomes 
- histones - and the inheritance of small RNAs in the cytoplasm of 
the egg. 
In a broader sense, epigenetic inheritance refers to any mechanisms 
creating parent-offspring correlation independent of correlations 
in genotype. For example, the inheritance of temperament in rats 
and mice described above depends on methylation to stabilise gene 
expression patterns in the lifetime of an individual rodent, but those 
methylation patterns are not passed on directly to offspring. Instead, 
they are re-established in response to maternal behaviour. This is 
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'behavioural' inheritance rather than 'epigenetic' inheritance in the 
strict sense. 69 
The 'nature' of an animal is supposed to be something it inherits 
from its parents, which explains why it has the properties which 
are typical of its species, and whose manifestation counts as normal 
development. In the folkbiological picture an animal's nature is 
to be contrasted with the influence of the animal's environment. I 
have argued that the apparent continuity between this picture and 
the idea that animals inherit a genome which interacts with the 
environment is specious. First, as shown in the previous section, 
every trait depends on the interaction of genes and environment, and 
the patterns of interaction between them cannot be reduced to two 
types corresponding to 'innate' and 'acquired'. Second, as shown in 
this section, inheritance is not restricted to the genetic elements of the 
developmental matrix. If an animal's nature is what explains normal 
development, then its nature includes many of the environmental 
influences with which 'nature' has traditionally been contrasted. 
The examples considered so far have also highlighted the 
phenomenon of phenotypic plasticity. Evolution designs mechanisms 
for producing diversity as well as uniformity. An animal's nature is 
thus relevant to explaining why it differs from others of the same 
kind, as well as why it resembles them. Human nature includes 
human diversity. 
Rethinking human diversity 
Both folkbiology and traditional academic approaches to human 
diversity have an unfortunate tendency to contrast the universal, 
biological traits of human beings with their diverse, cultural traits. 
But evolution creates systems designed to function in a developmental 
context. In a species like ours that developmental context includes 
socialisation and exposure to all those factors that make up a culture. 
So this contrast is not well drawn. The ideas advocated in this lecture 
suggest an entirely different approach to human diversity, but one 
with strong precedents elsewhere in biology. 
I touched above on the fact that Darwinian species are collections 
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of populations of varying individuals. There is no essential property 
or cluster of properties that makes an organism a member of a 
species, except perhaps the historical property of being united in 
a particular kind of genealogical network. The same is true of the 
higher taxonomic groups which unite several species. But this does 
not mean that the intrinsic properties of individuals are irrelevant 
for taxonomy. The pattern of similarities and differences between 
organisms provides evidence of their evolutionary relationships. 
These inferred relationships are the justification for grouping them 
into species and higher taxa. 
The same, evolutionary, principles are used by biologists to classify 
the parts of organisms. The bones in a vertebrate skeleton are not 
classified in terms of their shape or position, but their shape and 
position is used as evidence of their evolutionary relationships, and 
they are classified in terms of those relationships. For example, the 
tiny bone supporting the equally tiny 'bastard wing' that disrupts 
the flow of air over a bird's wing is the same bone that is found in 
one of my fingers (there is some remaining controversy as to which 
finger), and that bone in my finger is the same bone as a long, thin 
bone that supports the wing-membrane of a bat. Despite the enormous 
differences in the shape and position of these bones, their shape and 
position provides solid evidence that these three are 'homologues' 
of one another. Classification by homology is the basis of anatomy, 
physiology, and neuroanatomy. The same fundamental principles 
underlie the classification of genes and of molecular-level structures 
in the cell. The classification of behaviour by homology poses 
special difficulties, but is a familiar part of behavioural biology. Yet, 
surprisingly, classification by homology has been neglected as an 
approach to human cultural diversity.72 
Homology has two particular strengths as a way of conceptualising 
human diversity. First, homology is a principle of identity through 
difference. Human facial expressions of emotion are homologous to 
certain facial expressions in chimpanzees, as was first pointed out by 
Darwin. But the homologous pairs of expression differ substantially 
in both form and function. Homology is not a matter of similarity, 
but of identifying the corresponding components of two systems. One 
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important use of homology is as a principled way to use one system 
as a model for investigating another system. The best model for a 
human emotion in chimpanzees is the homologous emotion, and this 
conclusion does not depend on any particular degree of similarity 
between the two. Hence, homology allows us to appreciate human 
diversity whilst still seeking to illuminate that diversity in terms of 
our common evolutionary origins. 
Second, recent developments in biology have reinterpreted the 
relationship between homology and genetics in a way that can act 
as a model for solving the problematic issue of the biological basis 
of novel human behaviours. Since the 1980s there have been major 
advances in molecular developmental biology - the field which 
relates developmental biology to the regulated expression of genes 
and the interaction of gene products. These advances include the 
realisation that the identity (homology) of parts at one level of 
biological organization is independent of the identity (homology) 
of their constituent parts at a lower level of organization. This came 
about primarily through the discovery of highly conserved gene 
control circuits underlying traits that are not homologous. Thus, 
for example, the paired appendages of vertebrates and arthropods 
share ancient genetic mechanisms that are hypothesized to have 
been in place controlling outgrowths of some sort from the bodies 
of the most ancient animals. Those mechanisms are homologous to 
one another.73 But the appendages they produce - the legs and arms 
of vertebrates and the legs of insects - are not homologous to one 
another. Conversely, the cascade of gene expression that induces 
masculinisation of the foetus in Ellobius rodents and the male sexual 
characteristics that result from that process are homologous to those 
seen in other mammalian species, despite the fact that some Ellobius 
species have lost the Y chromosome and the homologue of SRY, the 
'sex determining' gene.74 The lesson of these examples is that evolution 
can preserve a trait whilst transforming the molecular mechanism that 
produces it and, conversely, that evolution can redeploy an existing 
mechanism to underpin the development of a novel trait. 
These principles have important applications to the biological 
basis of human diversity. Human diversity results mainly from the 
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fact that human development is an interaction between the evolved 
developmental system and a wide range of environments, including 
novel environments. Exploring this micro-diversity in the way that 
biologists explore the diversity of living forms would mean replacing 
the question 'is this the same?' with the question 'is this homologous, 
and at what level of analysis?' For example, the question of whether 
certain emotions are found in all human cultures has been addressed 
by asking how similar they are, or by identifying some aspect of 
similarity and arguing that it is (or is not) essential to the identity of 
that emotion. 75 It would be both more meaningful and more tractable 
to seek to identify the corresponding (homologous) elements of the 
emotional repertoire of the two cultures, and to determine at what 
level of analysis claims of homology can be defended. For example, 
it need not be whole emotions that are homologous. A behavioural 
expression might be homologous although it has now been recruited 
for a very different function. Or an early phase in the development 
of two very different emotions might be homologous, reflecting their 
diversification from some shared precursor. 
Comparative biology provides sophisticated ways to think about 
the commonalities that underlie biological diversity. Bringing order 
to that diversity is not about identifying universal elements, but 
about finding order in the pattern of similarity and difference. This 
order reflects the fact that diverse organisms descend from a common 
ancestor and also the fact that many developmental mechanisms are 
shared amongst organisms and are reused in new contexts. Hence 
corresponding parts can be identified in different organisms at 
various levels of analysis. Taking a biological perspective on human 
nature can mean treating human diversity in much the same way. It 
need not be restricted to demonstrating or refuting the existence of 
human universals. 
Conclusion 
In this lecture I have tried to sketch a conception of human nature 
and its biological basis that can be welcomed by the humanities and 
social sciences. In doing so, I have had to argue against a highly 
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intuitive picture of human nature which derives from 'folkbiology'. 
In place of this, I have tried to put a picture of human nature in which 
development is central. I have suggested that the primary sense which 
should be attached to the term 'human nature' is simply what human 
beings are like, not some cause that makes them that way. As such, 
human nature is primarily the pattern of similarity and difference 
amongst human beings. This pattern results from the operation 
of the evolved human developmental system in a wide variety of 
environments, some of them novel. Human nature in the other sense 
- the cause of this pattern - is the human developmental system. This 
is distributed far beyond the traditional boundaries of the organism 
in the whole matrix of resources that previous generations bring into 
existence through multiple mechanisms of heredity. 
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